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We consider a fundamental pricing model in which a fixed number of units of a reusable resource are used to
serve customers. Customers arrive to the system according to a stochastic process and upon arrival decide
whether or not to purchase the service, depending on their willingness-to-pay and the current price. The
service time during which the resource is used by the customer is stochastic and the firm may incur a service
cost. This model represents various markets for reusable resources such as cloud computing, shared vehicles,
rotable parts, and hotel rooms. In the present paper, we analyze this pricing problem when the firm attempts
to maximize a weighted combination of three central metrics: profit, market share, and service level. Under
Poisson arrivals, exponential service times, and standard assumptions on the willingness-to-pay distribution,
we establish a series of results that characterize the performance of static pricing in such environments.
In particular, while an optimal policy is fully dynamic in such a context, we prove that a static pricing
policy simultaneously guarantees 78.9% of the profit, market share, and service level from the optimal policy.
Notably, this result holds for any service rate and number of units the firm operates. In the special case where
there are two units and the induced demand is linear, we also prove that the static policy guarantees 95.5%
of the profit from the optimal policy. Our numerical findings on a large testbed of instances suggest that the
latter result is quite indicative of the profit obtained by the static pricing policy across all parameters.
Key words : reusable resources, dynamic pricing, static pricing, approximation algorithm
1. Introduction
In many service industries, the same resource to serve one customer can be used to serve
future customers once the initial service is completed. This type of resource is commonly
referred to as a reusable resource. For instance, in the hotel or car rental industry, a fixed
number of rooms or vehicles are available to accommodate customers. Each customer uses
one of these resources for some number of days until check out or return, after which it
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is free to be used by another customer. In a related example, many offices, campuses, or
apartment buildings offer a pool of bicycles or vehicles to be rented or shared by their
members, and units are always returned to their origin after being used by a member.
Another example of a reusable resource is cloud computing servers, which can be used
by customers to complete jobs after which they become available for processing new jobs.
Finally, another interesting example of a reusable resource arises in the repair industry for
aircraft, trains, and other large machinery. Specifically, there is a class of spare parts that
are known as rotable, meaning that when they break, the customer exchanges the broken
part for a working part with the repair agent. When the repair agent receives the broken
part, it is “utilized” for some time as it is being repaired, after which it becomes available
again to service potential future customers.
All of the examples above share several important features which we shall incorporate
into our model. First, the number of units available of each resource is fixed (over appro-
priate time horizons), as acquiring more capacity or units involves significant investments.
Second, when a resource is used, the service time is generally stochastic and varies across
customers. Third, customers are price-sensitive and in turn the demand rate in each of these
applications can be controlled by the price (which can be a one-time fee or an hourly/daily
fee to the customer). Fourth, there is a cost incurred by the service provider associated
with the usage of a unit (e.g., in terms of cleaning, maintenance, or repair). Finally, in
each of these settings it is highly unusual for a customer to wait for service. That is, if all
units of the resource are occupied, the customer is typically lost.
In all of the settings above, the seller may have multiple objectives. The profit rate
is clearly a fundamental objective for any service provider, but typically such providers
also focus significantly on their market share and service level, i.e., the probability that
an arriving customer finds a resource available. The latter two metrics are driven by the
long term objectives of maintaining a prominent position in the market and ensuring that
consumers find the service reliable.
In such environments, an optimal policy will be highly dynamic in general, adjusting its
prices often, as a function of the supply conditions. The question the present paper aims
to address is the following. What is the performance of a simple static pricing (one price)
policy in such environments? This question has dual practical and theoretical motivations.
On the one hand, in practice, dynamic pricing may not be feasible when prices need to
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be published in a catalog upfront or may be undesirable due to the negative perception
by customers. On the other hand, the existing literature in dynamic pricing has argued
for particular objectives that static pricing yields near-optimal performance in large-scale
systems (see literature review). How robust is such an insight for a combination of objec-
tives and for arbitrary scales? (While the scale for cloud computing may be large, it is
often small as well, e.g., rotable spare parts.) In particular, in the present paper, we aim to
derive universal performance guarantees for static pricing with respect to the profit, mar-
ket share, and service level objectives, with an optimal dynamic pricing strategy serving
as the benchmark. In particular, we aim to provide results on the strength of static pricing
that hold across all possible parameter regimes and scales.
To that end, we anchor our analysis around the following prototypical model. A service
provider manages a pool of a single type of reusable resource. The firm uses the reusable
resources to deliver service to customers over an infinite horizon. Customers arrive accord-
ing to a Poisson process in which the rate depends on the price set by the firm. We make
the standard assumption that the revenue rate is concave in the arrival rate. Upon arrival,
a customer seizes one unit of the resources for an exponentially distributed random amount
of time and pays a fee (which could depend on the realized duration of usage or be fixed in
advance). The unit of resource occupied by a customer becomes available to others after
service completion. The firm may also incur some cost of service. The goal of the firm
is to decide on the optimal pricing policy to maximize a combination of three different
objectives: profit rate, market share, and service level.
The main contributions of the present paper lie in deriving universal performance guar-
antees for static pricing and can be summarized as follows.
• We establish that for any combination of the three objectives – profit rate, market
share, and service level – there exists a static pricing policy which can achieve at least
78.9% of the value of each objective under the optimal dynamic pricing policy. This result
holds for any capacity size, market size, and service rate. Our proof relies on constructing
an explicit static policy, characterizing a lower bound in terms of the stock-in probabilities
of our policy and the optimal policy, and analyzing this ratio using a change of variables.
• We consider a special case where the service provider is a profit maximizer, there
are two units of the reusable resource, and the demand rate is linear in the price. We
prove in this case that the static policy achieves at least 95.5% of the optimal profit from
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dynamic pricing. This result holds for any market size and service rate. Moreover, this
exact scenario arises frequently in practice in the context of providing (very expensive)
rotable spare parts (Besbes, Elmachtoub, and Sun 2019).
• We complement the theoretical results above with numerical experiments over a broad
test bed. These illustrate that the performance of static pricing is in general even better.
Furthermore, for profit maximization, we find the performance of static pricing is always
above 97.5% of that obtained by an optimal dynamic pricing policy, indicating the robust-
ness of the insights derived beyond the exact conditions assumed in the theorems.
To the best of our knowledge, these are the first universal guarantees derived for static
pricing for this class of problems. Furthermore, the bounds derived highlight the very high
performance of static pricing.
1.1. Literature review
We next provide an overview of the literature on the effectiveness of static pricing policies in
the context of perishable inventory, queuing systems, and reusable resources. We note that
although a server in a queueing system is indeed a reusable resource, these systems typically
allow for customers to wait for service. In contrast, the reusable resources literature assumes
that customers are immediately lost if no units are available.
The dynamic pricing literature has had an extensive focus on the context of perish-
able resources, where there is a finite time horizon to consume a finite number of units
of one or more resources (see den Boer (2015) for a recent survey). The seminal work
of Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) shows that if the revenue function is concave, a static
pricing policy loses at most 1/(2
√
min{C,λ∗t}), where C is the number of units and λ∗t
represents the expected number of sales under the myopic price. The authors also show
a universal guarantee of 1− 1/e for any parameter regime, with both results relying on
a concavity assumption on the revenue rate (see also Ma et al. (2018)). Ma et al. (2018)
recently generalize these results for the same model without the concavity assumption, and
also provide non-adaptive pricing policies for assortment optimization and non-stationary
demand settings with constant factor performance guarantees. Chen et al. (2018) showed
that the 1− 1/e guarantee and asymptotic optimality for static pricing also holds in the
presence of strategic customers. Gallego et al. (2008) establish conditions for when static
pricing is optimal in the presence of strategic customers. The value of static over dynamic
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pricing policies has also been considered in models with inventory cost and replenish-
ment considerations, such as those in Federgruen and Heching (1999), Chen et al. (2006),
Yin and Rajaram (2007), Chen et al. (2010). Related to static pricing policies are poli-
cies with limited price changes, such as those considered in Feng and Gallego (1995),
Bitran and Mondschein (1997), Netessine (2006), C¸elik et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2015),
Cheung et al. (2017). Note that in our model there are no inventory costs, and inventory
can be repeatedly reused over an infinite time horizon.
There is also an extensive literature on dynamic pricing in queues.
Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis (2000) provide numerical results showing the promise of static
pricing in multi-class systems. Ata and Shneorson (2006) studied the dynamic pricing of
an M/M/1 service system where the objective is welfare maximization, and numerically
show it can have significant gains over static pricing. Maglaras and Zeevi (2005) showed
in a service system, the revenue generated by the fluid-optimal prices are near optimal
when the capacity and market potential are both large. In a related model where the
objective is revenue maximization, with observable queues, Kim and Randhawa (2017)
quantify more precisely the asymptotic value of dynamic pricing in large systems and
prove conditions under which a two price policy is almost as good as a dynamic pricing
policy. Banerjee et al. (2015) provide a queueing analysis of a ride-share platform where
the customers are modeled as servers, and show that a static price is asymptotically equal
to a dynamic price policy for large-scale systems, although dynamic pricing is more robust
to modeling error.
Closest to our formulation is the work of Gans and Savin (2007) who study dynamic pric-
ing to maximize the expected profit for rentals. Their model considers discounted rewards
with a discrete price ladder, although with multiple customer types. They show the near-
optimality of static pricing in highly utilized rental systems where both the offered load and
system capacity are large. To the best of our knowledge, all of the previously mentioned
results quantifying the gap between static pricing and dynamic pricing hold asymptotically
when the scale of the system is large. In contrast, our results provide universal guarantees
that do not rely on the scale of the system. Recently, Banerjee et al. (2016) consider a
general network of a single type of resource where prices control the rates between nodes,
and prove a guarantee of C/(C + n− 1) for possibly multiple objectives but zero service
times, where n is the number of nodes and C is the number of units. With non-zero service
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times, as we consider in our paper, a looser guarantee can be provided only when C is large
enough. Our paper provides a guarantee for any number of units, but does not consider a
general network.
Various related studies focus on dynamic heuristics, multiple types of reusable
resources, and other levers beyond pricing. Lei and Jasin (2018) studies the dynamic
pricing problem in a setting with deterministic service times and describe policies
that are asymptotically optimal in the regime where demand and resource capacity
are both large. Variants of the assortment optimization problem have been consid-
ered in Rusmevichientong, Sumida, and Topaloglu (2017), Owen and Simchi-Levi (2017)
and Goyal, Iyengar, and Wang (2018) with various universal approximation guarantees.
The results in the first two papers can be extended to allow for dynamic pricing with
discrete price points. Iyengar, Sigman et al. (2004) and Levi and Radovanovic´ (2010)
use linear programming approaches to design admission control policies for such sys-
tems, which is a special case of dynamic pricing where a resource is either priced
at a nominal price or at infinity. Their admission control policies are asymptotically
optimal, and Levi and Radovanovic´ (2010) also provides a universal guarantee of 1/2.
Chen, Levi, and Shi (2017) and Chen and Shi (2018) consider generalizations of this model
that permit advanced reservations and strategic customers, respectively.
1.2. Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model along with structural
properties of the optimal policy. In Section 3, we prove the 78.9% performance guarantee
of static pricing under our multi-objective setting for any parameter range. We then refine
our guarantee to 95.5% in Section 4 for the special case of profit maximization with two
units under linear demand. We conduct numerical experiments in Section 5 that show that
the actual performance of static pricing is even stronger than our guarantee, and that such
performance still holds when the exact assumptions of the theoretical results do not hold.
2. Model and Preliminaries
In this section, we first describe a general model for pricing a reusable resource. We then
describe the various performance objectives the service provider may use, followed by
several important properties of the optimal dynamic pricing policy.
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2.1. Pricing Model for a Reusable Resource
We consider a model in which a service provider has a fixed number of identical, non-
perishable units of a reusable resource that are sold to price-sensitive customers. The total
number of units of the reusable resource that the provider has is C. At any point in time,
each unit of the resource is either available for sale or occupied. Note that an occupied unit
can be interpreted as a customer using the unit in the cloud computing and ride sharing
examples, or being repaired in the rotable spare parts example from Section 1.
Customers arrive to the system over time according to a Poisson process with rate
Λ> 0. Each customer has an i.i.d. willingness-to-pay drawn from a valuation distribution
F . When a customer arrives, the provider offers a unit at some price p, and a customer
decides to purchase usage of the resource if their willingness to pay exceeds p. We denote
by λ(p) := ΛF¯ (p) the effective arrival rate at price p. When a customer decides to purchase
usage, one unit is then occupied for a random amount of time that follows an exponential
distribution with mean 1/µ. We assume that the usage times are i.i.d. across customers
and independent of the customer valuations.
While a unit is being occupied, the firm cannot sell that unit until it is returned to the
system, i.e., a customer finishes using the unit or the provider finishes repairing the unit.
The firm incurs a cost c to service one customer, which may be a cleaning, maintenance,
or repair cost. Any customer that arrives when all units are occupied is lost, regardless of
the current price being offered. This assumption is largely motivated by the fact that in
most of our applications the customers are seeking immediate service, and would naturally
seek out a competitor if the provider has no units available.
We assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between prices and effective arrival
rates so that λ(p) has a unique inverse, denoted by p(λ). Therefore, one can view the
effective arrival rate λ as the decision variable. The firm dynamically determines a target
effective arrival rate λ which can be realized with the corresponding price p(λ). From an
analysis perspective, the effective arrival rate is more convenient to work with. We shall
make the standard assumption in the revenue management literature that the profit rate
function λ(p(λ)− c) is concave in λ.
The set of admissible policies, Π, is the set of non-anticipating policies, i.e., policies such
that the effective arrival rate at time t, λ(t), may only depend on events up to t−. We shall
also be interested in the class of static policies, Πs ⊂Π, that simply fix a single arrival
rate λ (price) at every time t.
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2.2. Performance metrics
One natural metric when selling the reusable resources is the expected profit rate. Fix a
pricing policy pi and let λ(t) denote the corresponding effective arrival rate at time t. Let
Npi(t) denote the corresponding arrival process. Note that the latter is a non-stationary
Poisson process with intensity λ(t). Let Qpi(t) denote the number of on-hand units at time
t. The long-run average profit rate Ppi is given by
Ppi = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
1{Qpi(t)> 0}(p(λ(t))− c)dNpi(t)
]
. (1)
For simplicity in the exposition of the paper, we assume p(λ(t)) is a one-time fee a user
pays for the service. Note that the analysis presented easily generalizes to the case when a
user’s payment depends on usage time, i.e., it is equivalent to charge a one-time price that
is simply the price per time unit multiplied by the expected usage time.
While the firm wants to maximize its profit, it may also want to keep a certain level of
market share, i.e., the expected number of units sold, as well as a certain service level. The
market share objective MSpi is directly aligned with maximizing sales, while the service
level objective SLpi is measured by the fraction of time at least one unit is available. These
two objectives can be represented as
MSpi = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E [Npi(T )]
and
SLpi = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
1{Qpi(t)> 0}dt
]
.
Note that there is a trade-off between the various metrics; the optimal solution for one
objective will generally be sub-optimal for another. For instance, maximizing the service
level corresponds to setting a static price as large as possible, while maximizing market
share corresponds to setting a static price of zero. Clearly neither price will result in any
profit at all.
In order to take the different objectives into account simultaneously, we assume the firm
maximizes a weighted combination of the objectives,
α1Ppi +α2MSpi +α3SLpi, (2)
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where α1, α2, α3 ≥ 0 are the weights placed on each objective by the service provider.
Without loss of generality, we assume α1 + α2 + α3 = 1. We let V
∗ denote the long-run
value under the optimal policy, and is thus defined by
V ∗ := sup
pi∈Π
{α1Ppi +α2MSpi +α3SLpi} . (3)
We denote by pi∗ an optimal policy. Similarly, we let V s denote the long-run value under
the optimal static policy, and is thus defined by
V s := sup
pi∈Πs
{α1Ppi +α2MSpi +α3SLpi} . (4)
In the present paper, we focus on universal performance guarantees for static pricing.
In particular, we shall focus on the worst-case performance of the optimal static pricing
policy in comparison to the optimal dynamic policy. That is, we seek to characterize the
maximum possible loss over all possible instances of our model. Formally, we let Ω denote
the family of instances
Ω := {(C,µ, p(·), c, α1, α2, α3) :C ∈N+, c, µ> 0, α1+α2+α3 =1, αi≥ 0, λ(p(λ)−c) concave in λ}.
In turn, we aim to provide a universal lower bound on
inf
Ω
V s
V ∗
,
which is the ratio between the objectives under the optimal static and dynamic pricing
policies. In fact, we shall show that our bound applies to the corresponding ratios of each
of the three objectives.
2.3. Analysis of the benchmark V ∗
We shall now characterize the structure of an optimal solution to the dynamic pricing prob-
lem stated in Equation (3). Given the Poisson assumption on arrivals and the exponential
assumption on service times, without loss of optimality, one may focus on stationary poli-
cies that update the price only at changes in the number of units on-hand. As we shall
see, this allows us to provide closed-form expressions for the steady state distribution and
objectives under a particular policy.
An admissible policy pi may be represented by C arrival rates λ1, . . .λC . When the
provider has only i units available, the price is set to p(λi). Note that the static policy is a
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special case where λ1 = . . .= λC . Furthermore, the system can now be modeled as a birth-
death process where each state represents the number of units available. The transition
rate from state i to i+1 is (C− i)µ for i= 0, . . . ,C−1. The transition rate from i to i−1
is λi for i= 1, . . . ,C. A standard calculation for computing the steady state probabilities,
Pi(pi) yields that
Pi(pi) =
C!
(C − i)!
ΠCj=i+1
λj
µ∑C
k=0
C!
(C−k)!Π
C
j=k+1
λj
µ
, i= 0, . . . ,C.
Using the steady state probabilities, we may express our three objectives simply as
Ppi =
C∑
i=1
λi(p(λi)− c)Pi(pi) (5)
MSpi =
C∑
i=1
λiPi(pi), (6)
SLpi =
C∑
i=1
Pi(pi) = 1−P0(pi). (7)
Let us denote by λ∗i the effective arrival rate in state i under the optimal policy, and by
P
∗
i the steady-state probabilities of being in state i under the optimal policy. In Lemma 1,
we show a fundamental property that effective arrival rates are decreasing as the number
of units available increases. Moreover, all such arrival rates do not exceed the myopic rate
λ¯, which yields the highest possible instantaneous objective rate.
Lemma 1. Let λ∗i be the optimal arrival rate when the on-hand inventory level is i. Let
λ¯ denote the myopic arrival rate where λ¯= argmaxλ λ(α1(p(λ)− c)+α2). Then
λ¯ ≥ λ∗C ≥ · · · ≥ λ∗1. (8)
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Section 6. Notice that the result presented in
Lemma 1 shares the same structural property as presented in Theorem 1 in Gans and Savin
(2007) where the objective is only profit maximization in a discounted reward setting.
We extend the analysis to a long-run average reward setting with multiple objectives and
prove that monotonicity of optimal prices (and rates) still holds. We will make use of this
property in the subsequent analysis.
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3. Static Pricing Guarantee for Multi-Objective Optimization
We next investigate the performance of static pricing and present our first main result.
Theorem 1. There exists a static pricing policy pis that guarantees at least 15
19
of the
profit rate, market share, and service level of the optimal dynamic pricing policy. Equiva-
lently,
inf
Ω
min
{Ppis
Ppi∗ ,
MSpis
MSpi∗ ,
SLpis
SLpi∗
}
≥ 15
19
.
Theorem 1 provides a strong guarantee: there exists a static price that nearly approxi-
mates the performance of an optimal dynamic pricing policy. Specifically, this price guar-
antees that the profit rate, market share, and service level are at least 15
19
≈ .789 of the
corresponding values under the dynamic pricing policy. Of course, a direct consequence of
Theorem 1 is that the optimal single price will have an overall objective of at least 0.789
of the objective under the optimal dynamic pricing policy as well. It is important to note
that our result makes no assumption on the number of units in the system, demand rate,
or service rate. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature which require the system
usage and capacity to be large to provide theoretical guarantees.
It is worthwhile to note that our proof is constructive and exhibits a particular static
price that yields such performance. The static price behind our major finding is constructed
using the optimal policy, which we denote by pi∗. Recall that λ∗i are the arrival rates under
the optimal policy and P∗i are the steady-state probabilities. The single price is simply
chosen so that the corresponding arrival rate, λ˜, is the same as the expected arrival rate
under the optimal policy when units are available. More specifically, the static arrival rate
λ˜ is selected so that
λ˜=
∑C
i=1 λ
∗
iP
∗
i∑C
i=1P
∗
i
=
∑C
i=1 λ
∗
iP
∗
i
1−P∗0
. (9)
Our proof, that we detail in the next subsection exploits this structure, together with the
structure of the underlying birth and death process, to derive a universal guarantee.
3.1. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is organized around two main steps. In the first step, we exploit the concavity
of the revenue rate function (in the quantity space) to establish that for each of the three
objectives, the ratio of the performances under the static and optimal policies is at least
the ratio of the corresponding service levels. The second step bounds the ratio of the service
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levels by 15/19 by enumerating several cases, with each case proven using elementary
calculus. A key component of this second step is a change of variables from demand rates
to the product of demand rates. Both steps fundamentally exploit the explicit construction
of λ˜ in Eq. (9). With some abuse of notation, we index quantities with λ˜ to denote these
under the static policy induced by this static rate.
Step 1. In the first step, we lower bound each of P
λ˜
Ppi∗ ,
MSλ˜
MSpi∗ , and
SLλ˜
SLpi∗ by
1−P0(λ˜)
1−P∗0
. Note
that by Eq. (7), the lower bound is exact for the service level ratio, i.e.,
SLλ˜
SLpi∗ =
1−P0(λ˜)
1−P∗0
. (10)
The lower bound is also exact for the market share ratio. Using Eqs. (6) and (9), we have
that
MS λ˜
MSpi∗ =
λ˜(1−P0(λ˜))∑C
i=1 λ
∗
iP
∗
i
=
∑C
i=1 λ
∗
i P
∗
i
1−P∗0 (1−P0(λ˜))∑C
i=1 λ
∗
iP
∗
i
=
1−P0(λ˜)
1−P∗0
. (11)
For the profit ratio by the ratio, we have
P λ˜
Ppi∗ =
λ˜(p(λ˜)− c)(1−P0(λ˜))∑C
i=1 λ
∗
i (p(λ
∗
i )− c)P∗i
=
λ˜(p(λ˜)− c)∑C
i=1 λ
∗
i (p(λ
∗
i )− c) P
∗
i
1−P∗0
· 1−P0(λ˜)
1−P∗0
≥ λ˜(p(λ˜)− c)
λ˜(p(λ˜)− c) ·
1−P0(λ˜)
1−P∗0
=
1−P0(λ˜)
1−P∗0
. (12)
The first equality follow from Eq. (5). The inequality follows from the fact that the function
λ(p(λ) − c) is concave in λ and applying Jensen’s inequality to a random variable that
takes value λ∗i with probability
P
∗
i
1−P∗0
for i= 1, . . . ,C. Note that the expected value of this
random variable is exactly λ˜ by Eq. (9). We next characterize the stock-in probabilities, and
the remainder of the proof, in terms of the new z variables. This variable transformation
unlocks the ability to apply (many) basic calculus ideas to prove our lower bound.
Step 2. To find the lower bound of the ratio of stock-in probabilities, we define a set of
auxiliary notation which will be useful in our subsequent analysis. We define ai :=
C!
(C−i)!
for i= 0,1, . . . ,C and zi := Π
C
j=i
λ∗j
µ
for i= 1, . . . ,C +1. For clarity, note that zC+1 = 1. We
also define x :=
∑C
k=1 akzk+1 and y :=
∑C
k=2 akzk.
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Using the steady-state probabilities derived in Section 2.3 and the definition of λ˜, the
service levels of the static and dynamic policies can be written as
1−P∗0=
∑C
i=1 aizi+1∑C
i=0 aizi+1
1−P0(λ˜) =
∑C
i=1 ai[(
∑C
k=1 akzk)/(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)]
C−i∑C
i=0 ai[(
∑C
k=1 akzk)/(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)]
C−i .
From the above, it is clear that the ratio of the service levels may be written as a function
of z1, . . . , zC . We call this function R(z1, . . . , zC). Formally,
R(z1, · · · , zC) := 1−P0(λ˜)
1−P∗0
=
(
∑C
k=0 akzk+1)(
∑C
i=1 ai[(
∑C
k=1 akzk)/(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)]
C−i)
(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)(
∑C
i=0 ai[(
∑C
k=1 akzk)/(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)]
C−i)
.
We next develop a uniform lower bound on R(z1, · · · , zC) by developing separate bounds
for the cases where C is small (C ≤ 3) or large (C ≥ 4).
Step 2a. We prove the lower bound for the cases where C is at most 3. When C = 1,
then λ˜= λ∗1 and therefore R(z1) = 1. When C = 2, we have
R(z1, z2) =
z21 +4z1z2+3z1+4z
2
2 +6z2+2
z21 +4z1z2+2z1+5z
2
2 +6z2+2
≥ 4
5
,
where the inequality follows by matching terms and looking at the minimum ratio. When
C = 3, the numerator of R(z1, z2, z3) is
48+192z3+120z2+32z1+264z
2
3 +336z2z3+96z1z3+108z
2
2 +64z1z2+10z
2
1 +120z
3
3
+228z2z
2
3 +68z1z
2
3 +144z
2
2z3+88z1z2z3+14z
2
1z3+30z
3
2 +28z1z
2
2 +9z
2
1z2+ z
3
1
while the denominator of R(z1, z2, z3) is
48+192z3+120z2+24z1+264z
2
3 +336z2z3+72z1z3+108z
2
2 +48z1z2+6z
2
1 +128z
3
3
+252z2z
2
3 +60z1z
2
3 +168z
2
2z3+84z1z2z3+12z
2
1z3+38z
3
2 +30z1z
∗2
2 +9z
2
1z2+ z
3
1 .
By matching terms in the numerator and denominator, it is then clear that
R(z1, z2, z3)≥ 30
38
=
15
19
.
Step 2b. Next, we consider the case where C ≥ 4. While the function ratio R(·) is
difficult to analyze directly, we will derive a lower bound on R, which we denote by R˜(·),
which will be amenable to analysis. The bound can be derived simply by observing that
R(z1, . . . , zC) =
(
∑C
k=0 akzk+1)(
∑C
i=1 ai[(
∑C
k=1 akzk)/(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)]
C−i)
(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)(
∑C
i=0 ai[(
∑C
k=1 akzk)/(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)]
C−i)
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=
(
∑C
k=0 akzk+1)[
∑C
i=1 ai(
∑C
k=1 akzk)
C−i(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)
i−1]
[
∑C
i=0 ai(
∑C
k=1 akzk)
C−i(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)
i]
≥ (
∑C
k=0 akzk+1)[
∑4
i=1 ai(
∑C
k=1 akzk)
C−i(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)
i−1]
[
∑4
i=0 ai(
∑C
k=1 akzk)
C−i(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)
i]
=
(
∑C
k=0 akzk+1)[
∑4
i=1 ai(
∑C
k=1 akzk)
4−i(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)
i−1]
[
∑4
i=0 ai(
∑C
k=1 akzk)
4−i(
∑C
k=1 akzk+1)
i]
=: R˜(z1, . . . , zC).
Next, we derive a lower bound on R˜(·) though two subcases, depending on the ratio of y
to z1. We first establish in Lemma 2 (proved in Section 6) that the partial derivative with
respect to the first argument is non-negative as long as y≥ a1z1.
Lemma 2. Fix C ≥ 4. Fix z1, z2, ..., zC ∈ [0,∞)C and suppose y≥ a1z1, then
∂R˜
∂z1
≥ 0.
When y≥ a1z1, Lemma 2 implies that the worst case value of R˜ occurs when z1 = 0. In turn,
in Lemma 3 (proved in Section 6), we establish a uniform lower bound on R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC).
Lemma 3. Fix C ≥ 4. For all z2, ..., zC ∈ [0,∞)C−1, we have
R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC)≥ 104
131
.
From Lemmas 2 and 3, we can conclude that when y ≥ a1z1, then R˜(z1, z2, . . . , zC) ≥
R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC)≥ 104131 .
If y≤ a1z1, then there is no guarantee on the derivative, but one may directly establish
a uniform lower bound on R˜ as articulated in Lemma 4 (proved in Section 6).
Lemma 4. Fix C ≥ 4 and suppose y≤ a1z1, then
R˜(z1, z2, . . . , zC)≥ 6
7
.
Combining both cases, We conclude that R(z1, z2, . . . , zC) ≥ R˜(z1, z2, . . . , zC) ≥
min{104
131
, 6
7
} ≥ 15
19
. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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3.2. Tightness of analysis
We present an example which shows that the lower bound of 15
19
in Theorem 1 can be tight
for a family of instances. That is, we shall describe instances in which the static policy we
construct, λ˜, achieves exactly a fraction 15/19 of the optimal dynamic policy. Namely, we
shall fix C = 3, α1 = 0, α2= 0, α3= 1, µ to be arbitrarily close to 0, and p(λ) =
1
λ
.
Since α3= 1, then the objective is to maximize the service level, that is
max
pi
SLpi = 1−P(pi).
The service level is always bounded above by 1, and hence it is clear that the policy
(λ∗1, λ
∗
2, λ
∗
3) = (0,Λ,Λ) is optimal since
SL(0,Λ,Λ) =
∑3
i=1
6
(3−i)!µ
iΠ3j=i+1λ
∗
j∑3
i=0
6
(3−i)!µ
iΠ3j=i+1λ
∗
j
=
∑3
i=1
6
(3−i)!µ
iΠ3j=i+1λ
∗
j
0+
∑3
i=1
6
(3−i)!µ
iΠ3j=i+1λ
∗
j
= 1.
Now let us consider the static policy λ˜ which we construct according to Eq. (9). Recall
from Section 3.1 that the performance of the static pricing policy with respect to the
service level and market share objectives is R(z1, z2, z3), where zi :=Π
C
j=i
λ∗j
µ
. In addition, the
performance of the static pricing policy with respect to the profit rate is also R(z1, z2, z3)
because λ(p(λ)− c) is linear in λ if p(λ) = 1
λ
, which makes the Jensen’s inequality tight in
the derivation of Eq. (12). Since z1 =0, then the ratio becomes
R(z1, z2, z3)
=
48+192z3+120z2+264z
2
3 +336z2z3+108z
2
2 +120z
3
3 +228z2z
2
3 +144z
2
2z3+30z
3
2
48+192z3+120z2+264z23 +336z2z3+108z
2
2 +128z
3
3 +252z2z
2
3 +168z
2
2z3+38z
3
2
.
Since z2 =
Λ2
µ2
and z3 =
Λ
µ
, we have z3→∞ and z3 = o(z2) as µ→ 0, and hence
lim
µ→0
R(z1, z2, z3) =
30
38
=
15
19
.
4. Sharpening the Bound for Profit Maximization
In this section, we seek to focus more deeply on the profit maximization objective corre-
sponding to α1 = 1. This objective is central in the literature and we aim to understand to
what extent can our 78.9% guarantee from Section 3 be improved.
Theorem 2. Fix C = 2, and consider any rate µ and linear demand function λ(·). Let
pi∗ denote a revenue maximizing dynamic policy. Then there exists a static pricing policy
pis such that Ppis
Ppi∗ ≥ 0.955.
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This result establishes that for profit maximization, a simple static pricing policy guaran-
tees more than 95.5% of an optimal dynamic pricing policy. This is a much higher guarantee
than for the general multi-objective case. In particular, for profit maximization, there is
extremely limited value in dynamic pricing.
We note that due to the technical difficulty of the analysis, our result is limited to the
case with only 2 units (C = 2), and when the demand is linear (p(·) and λ(·) are linear),
a common assumption in both the literature and practice. However, in Section 5, we will
see numerically that the level of guarantee above is valid beyond the case C = 2 and linear
demand. In fact, our computational results shows that the 95.5% lower bound holds across
all possible instances considered in this paper.
The proof of Theorem 2 is again constructive in that it exhibits a particular static policy
with such a guarantee. This policy is the same as the one presented in Eq (9). The proof
relies on lower bounding the ratio of the service levels, which is indeed a lower bound on the
profit ratio as seen in Eq. (12). Then, the first order conditions of the profit maximization
objective are used to impose constraints on the worst-case arrival rates of an optimal policy,
which allows us to find a tighter bound on the ratio of the service levels.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let λ∗1, λ
∗
2 be the effective arrival rates under the optimal policy
for profit maximization, and p∗1, p
∗
2 be the corresponding optimal prices. Let z1 =
λ∗1λ
∗
2
µ2
and
z2 =
λ∗2
µ
. For the static policy, let λ˜ be defined according to (9). Since C = 2, by Eq. (12)
we have
P λ˜
P∗ ≥
1−P0(λ˜)
1−P∗0
=
z21 +4z1z2+3z1+4z
2
2 +6z2+2
z21 +4z1z2+2z1+5z
2
2 +6z2+2
:=R(z1, z2).
Next, we show that R(z1, z2) is increasing in z1 and decreasing in z2 by simply looking
at the first partial derivatives. Taking derivatives of R w.r.t z1 and z2 gives
∂R(z1, z2)
∂z1
=
−z21 +2z1z22 +4z32 +7z22 +6z2+2
(z21 +4z1z2+2z1+5z
2
2 +6z2+2)
2
≥ 0
∂R(z1, z2)
∂z2
=−2(z
2
1(z2+2)+ z1(2z
2
2 +7z2+3)+ z2(3z2+2))
(z21 +4z1z2+2z1+5z
2
2 +6z2+2)
2
≤ 0.
To see that the partial derivative w.r.t. z1 is non-negative, it is sufficient to show that
z1 ≤ z22 , which follows from the fact that λ∗1 ≤ λ∗2, established in Lemma 1. To see that
the partial derivative w.r.t. z2 is non-positive, observe that all terms in the numerator are
negative.
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The remainder of the proof proceeds by dividing the analysis in two cases: if z2 is above
or below
√
7−1
3
. When z2 ≤
√
7−1
3
, then in this case
R(z1, z2)≥R(0,
√
7− 1
3
)≈ 0.9557
since R(z1, z2) is increasing in z1 and decreasing in z2.
For the remainder of the proof we consider the case where z2 >
√
7−1
3
. In this case, we
leverage the first-order optimality conditions of the problem to show in Lemma 5 that z1
and z2 must be within a provable quantity of one another. This constraint then allows us
to tighten the lower bound on R(·). Denote γi =−p′(λi). Notice that since the demand is
linear, then γ1= γ2. Define β :=
p∗1−c
γ1
≥ 0, and now we are ready to state the bounds on z1
and z2 in Lemma 5 (proved in Section 6).
Lemma 5. Let g(β, z2) =
√
(z2+1)2+βz2(z2+2)− (z2+1). Then
z1 ≥ g(β, z2) (13)
z2 ≤
√
2β. (14)
By Lemma 5 and the fact that R(z1, z2) is non-decreasing in z1 we have that
R(z1, z2)≥R(g(β, z2), z2)
=
(2+β)z22 +(2β+3)z2+(2z2+1)
√
(1+β)z22 +2(1+β)z2+1+1
(3+β)z22 +(2β+4)z2+2z2
√
(1+β)z22 +2(1+β)z2+1+2
= 1− z
2
2 + z2+1−
√
(1+β)z22 +2(1+β)z2+1
(3+β)z22 +(2β+4)z2+2z2
√
(1+β)z22 +2(1+β)z2+1+2
:= 1−G(β, z2). (15)
Therefore, minimizing R(z1, z2) is equivalent to maximizing G(β, z2), for which we provide
an upper bound in Lemma 6 (proved in Section 6).
Lemma 6. If z2 ≥
√
7−1
3
and β ≥ 0, then G(β, z2)≤ 0.0433.
Therefore, in the case when z2 ≥
√
7−1
3
, Eq. (15) and Lemma 6 imply that
R(z1, z2)≥ 1−G(β, z2)≥ 1− 0.0433= 0.9567.
Combining both cases, we obtain the claimed result and the proof is complete. 
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5. Numerical Experiments
In this section, we conduct a set of numerical experiments to test the performance of the
static pricing policy. We consider three types of demand functions: linear, exponential,
and logistic. For a linear demand curve, we assume it takes the form λ=−ap+ b; for an
exponential demand curve, we assume it follows λ= be−ap; for the logistic demand curve,
we assume it is λ = b(1+e
−ap0 )
1+ea(p−p
0)
where p0 is the inflection point. Notice that in all three
demand curves, the maximum demand rate is set to be b when the price is set to 0.
For each value of C, we randomly generate the mean usage time uniformly in 1
µ
∈
[0.05,50]; a is randomly generated uniformly between 0.1 and 5; b is randomly generated
uniformly between 0.5 and 10; p0 is randomly generated uniformly between [0,20]. We
assume that the average service cost is 0, i.e., c= 0. We generate 1,000 different instances
of inputs and calculate the profit rate under the optimal dynamic pricing policy, the con-
structed static price policy λ˜ according to Eq. (9), and the best static price policy pis
∗
. We
report the worst case of P
λ˜
Ppi∗ and
Ppis
∗
Ppi∗ for each capacity level C. The results are summarized
in Table 1.
Linear Exponential Logistic
C P
λ˜
Ppi∗
Ppis
∗
Ppi∗
P λ˜
Ppi∗
Ppis
∗
Ppi∗
P λ˜
Ppi∗
Ppis
∗
Ppi∗
2 99.53% 99.54% 99.06% 99.07% 99.16% 99.18%
3 99.27% 99.28% 98.57% 98.60% 98.68% 98.72%
4 99.10% 99.12% 98.26% 98.31% 98.41% 98.46%
5 98.97% 99.00% 98.05% 98.11% 98.19% 98.28%
10 98.66% 98.71% 97.58% 97.70% 97.71% 97.84%
20 98.46% 98.55% 97.38% 97.56% 97.46% 97.70%
30 98.40% 98.51% 97.39% 97.57% 97.45% 97.68%
40 98.38% 98.51% 97.48% 97.62% 97.51% 97.72%
50 98.37% 98.51% 97.60% 97.69% 97.58% 97.79%
Table 1 Worst case profit ratio: static pricing policies vs. optimal dynamic pricing policy.
As one can observe, the performance of static pricing is generally higher than 97.5%.
When C = 2, we observe the worst case to be 99.53% in the case of linear demand, which
is even higher than the 95.5% guarantee proven in Theorem 2. We also note that this
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very high performance of static prices continues to hold when we depart from the exact
assumptions of Theorem 2, for general values of C and for exponential and logistic demand
curves.
In general, the worst case performance of static pricing (either the best static price or
the price we construct) does not happen when C = 2. However, the ratio of the profit
rate achieved by the static policy and the optimal profit rate appears to be relatively
independent of the value of C. Of course, as C approaches infinity, the worst case ratio
indeed converges to 1.
In addition, one may observe that the performance of the static price policy we con-
structed in the proofs is very close to the performance of the best static price for profit
maximization. The difference of the worst case performance between the two static prices
is usually less than 0.2%.
Using a similar testbed, we also conducted numerical experiments for the multi-objective
case. We use the linear demand model in the numerical experiment and randomly generate
the values of αi’s uniformly at random. The rest of the experiment settings are the same as
described before. We calculate the worst case performance of our constructed static price
compared to the total objective as well as for the three performance metrics. The results
are presented in Table 2.
C V
λ˜
V ∗
P λ˜
Ppi∗
MSλ˜
MSpi∗
SLλ˜
SLpi∗
2 81.08% 84.70% 81.03% 81.03%
3 80.32% 83.85% 80.23% 80.23%
4 80.95% 84.45% 80.82% 80.82%
5 81.80% 85.27% 81.63% 81.63%
10 85.37% 88.67% 85.02% 85.02%
15 87.68% 90.79% 87.17% 87.17%
20 89.30% 92.22% 88.67% 88.67%
Table 2 Performance of static pricing with multiple objectives.
As one may notice, the lowest of the worst case performance ratio happens when C = 3
at 80.32% for the overall objectives, and 80.23% for the market share and service level
objectives. For this worst case ratio, the values of αi’s are similar to the construction in
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our tightness example where α3 is very close to 1 while α1 and α2 is close to 0. This finding
is consistent with our tightness analysis.
6. Additional proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove this lemma by transforming the continuous time
Markov Decision Process (MDP) to a discrete time MDP and showing that the value
iteration operator preserve concavity and monotonicity.
Using standard techniques (see, e.g., Bertsekas (2012)), the continuous time MDP associ-
ated to Equation (3) can be transformed into a discrete time MDP, through uniformization,
and solved efficiently using value iteration. Let γ be given by
γ =
1
1+Λ+Cµ
,
where Λ is the maximum demand rate. Note that 1+Λ+Cµ upper bounds the transition
rates from any state in the Markov Chain.
Let h(i) denote the relative, long-run expected reward associated with having i units
available and η be the optimal average profit. The value iteration operator, T , takes the
following form,
T h(i) = max
λ∈[0,Λ]
{α1λ(p(λ)− c)+α2λ+α3− η+
γλh(i− 1)+ γµ(C− i)h(i+1)+ (1− γ(λ+µ(C− i))h(i))} ∀i (16)
where
h(0) = 0.
Letting h∗(i) denote the relative optimal expected reward of having i units available,
then h∗(i) = lim
n→∞
T nh(i). We next prove the fact that h∗(i) is nondecreasing and concave
by showing T h(i) is nondecreasing and concave if h(i) has the same properties.
For any state i, we can rewrite the value iteration presented in Equation (16) as follows:
T h(i) =A(i)+B(i)
where
A(i) = max
λ∈[0,Λ]
[α1λ(p(λ)− c)+α2λ+ γλh(i− 1)+ γ(1+Λ−λ)h(i)] ,
B(i) = γµ [(C− i)h(i+1)+ ih(i)]− η+α3.
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Denote
λi =argmaxA(i)
In order to show T h(i) is nondecreasing and concave, we will show both A(i) and B(i) are
nondecreasing and concave.
To show that A(i) is nondecreasing in i, observe that
A(i)−A(i− 1)=A(i)|λi −A(i− 1)|λi−1
≥A(i)|λi−1 −A(i− 1)|λi−1
= γλi−1 [h(i− 1)−h(i− 2)]+ γ(1+Λ−λi−1) [h(i)−h(i− 1)]
≥ 0.
The first inequality comes from the fact that λi is the maximizer of A(i). The last inequality
comes from the assumption that h(·) is nondecreasing.
To show that B(i) in nondecreasing in i, observe that
B(i)−B(i− 1) = γµ ((C − i)h(i+1)+ ih(i)− (C− i+1)h(i)− (i− 1)h(i− 1))
= γµ ((C − i) [h(i+1)−h(i)]+ (i− 1) [h(i)−h(i− 1)])
≥ 0,
since h(·) is nondecreasing and both γ and µ are positive.
To establish the concavity of A(i), observe that
A(i− 1)+A(i+1)− 2A(i)
=A(i− 1)|λi−1 +A(i+1)|λi+1 − 2A(i)|λi
≤A(i− 1)|λi−1 +A(i+1)|λi+1 −A(i)|λi−1 −A(i)|λi+1
= γλ(λi−1)h(i− 2)+ γ(1+Λ−λi−1)h(i− 1)+λi+1h(i)+ γ(1+Λ−λi+1)h(i+1)
−λi−1h(i− 1)+ γ(1+Λ−λi−1)h(i)−λi+1h(i− 1)+ γ(1+Λ−λi+1)h(i)
= γλi−1 [h(i− 2)+h(i)− 2h(i− 1)]+ γ(1+Λ) [h(i− 1)+h(i+1)− 2h(i)]
+ γλi+1 [2h(i)−h(i− 1)−h(i+1)]
= γλi−1 [h(i− 2)+h(i)− 2h(i− 1)]+ γ(1+Λ−λi+1) [h(i− 1)+h(i+1)− 2h(i)]
≤ 0.
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The first inequality follows from the fact that λi is the maximizer of A(i). Since Λ is the
maximum rate of customer arrivals, then 1 +Λ− λi+1 is positive and the last inequality
follows from the concavity of h(·).
To establish the concavity of B(i), observe that
B(i− 1)+B(i+1)− 2B(i)= γµ [(C− (i− 1))h(i)+ (i− 1)h(i− 1)]
+ γµ [(C− (i+1))h(i+2)+ (i+1)h(i+1)]
− γµ [2(C− i)h(i+1)− 2ih(i)]
= γµ [(i− 1) [h(i− 1)+h(i+1)− 2h(i)]]
+ γµ [(C− i− 1) [h(i+2)+h(i)− 2h(i+1)]]
≤ 0.
The last inequality follows from the assumption that h(·) is concave and the fact that both
γ and µ are positive. Recall from Equation (16), the optimal prices can be solved using
the following equation,
λ∗i = argmax
λ
λ[α1(p(λ)− c)+α2− γ(h∗(i)−h∗(i− 1)].
Given the nondecreasing and concave properties of h∗(·), we can conclude the desired
property of the optimal policy. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof follows by simply showing that ∂R˜(z1,...,zC)
∂z1
≥ 0, which
is equivalent to showing that the numerator of ∂R˜(z1,...,zC)
∂z1
is non-negative. To do this, we
first establish a few facts.
Since λ∗i is non-decreasing in i from Lemma 1, then for k= 1, . . . ,C we have that
z1zk+1 =Π
C
i=1
λ∗i
µ
ΠCj=k+1
λ∗j
µ
≤ΠCi=2
λ∗i
µ
ΠCj=k
λ∗hj
µ
= z2zk. (17)
Therefore,
y(a1z1+ y) =
(
C∑
j=2
ajzj
)(
C∑
i=1
aizi
)
≥ a2z2
(
C∑
i=1
aizi
)
≥ a2
(
C∑
i=1
aiz1zi+1
)
= a2z1x. (18)
where the second inequality follows from Eq. (17).
Under the assumption of y≥ a1z1 and the fact that y≤ (C− 1)x, we also have that
x≥ z1, (19)
x≥ a1z1+ y
2(C− 1) . (20)
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Using the definitions of x and y, we may rewrite R˜(·) as
R˜(z1, . . . , zC) =
(a0z1+x)[a1(a1z1+ y)
3+ a2(a1z1+ y)
2x+ a3(a1z1+ y)x
2+ a4x
3]
a0(a1z1+ y)4+ a1(a1z1+ y)3x+ a2(a1z1+ y)2x2+ a3(a1z1+ y)x3+ a4x4
.
The derivative of the numerator of R˜(z1, . . . , zC)is
[(a1z1+ y)
4+ a1(a1z1+ y)
3x+ a2(a1z1+ y)
2x2+ a3(a1z1+ y)x
3+ a4x
4]×
[3a21(a1z1+ y)
2(z1+ x)+ 2a1a2(a1z1+ y)(z1+ x)x+ a1a3(z1+ x)x
2
+ a1(a1z1+ y)
3+ a2(a1z1+ y)
2x+ a3(a1z1+ y)x
2+ a4x
3]
− [a1(a1z1+ y)3(z1+ x)+ a2(a1z1+ y)2(z1+ x)x+ a3(a1z1+ y)(z1+ x)x2+ a4(z1+ x)x3]×
[4a1(a1z1+ y)
3+3a21(a1z1+ y)
2x+2a1a2(a1z1+ y)x
2+ a1a3x
3]
=3a21(a1z1+ y)
6(z1+ x)+ 2a1a2(a1z1+ y)
5(z1+ x)x+ a1a3(a1z1+ y)
4(z1+ x)x
2
+ a1(a1z1+ y)
7+ a2(a1z1+ y)
6x+ a3(a1z1+ y)
5x2+ a4(a1z1+ y)
4x3
+3a31(a1z1+ y)
5(z1+ x)x+2a
2
1a2(a1z1+ y)
4(z1+ x)x
2 + a21a3(a1z1+ y)
3(z1+ x)x
3
+ a21(a1z1+ y)
6x+ a1a2(a1z1+ y)
5x2+ a1a3(a1z1+ y)
4x3 + a1a4(a1z1+ y)
3x4
+3a21a2(a1z1+ y)
4(z1+ x)x
2+2a1a
2
2(a1z1+ y)
3(z1+ x)x
3 + a1a2a3(a1z1+ y)
2(z1+ x)x
4
+ a1a2(a1z1+ y)
5x2+ a22(a1z1+ y)
4x3 + a2a3(a1z1+ y)
3x4 + a2a4(a1z1+ y)
2x5
+3a21a3(a1z1+ y)
3(z1+ x)x
3+2a1a2a3(a1z1+ y)
2(z1+ x)x
4 + a1a
2
3(a1z1+ y)(z1+ x)x
5
+ a1a3(a1z1+ y)
4x3+ a2a3(a1z1+ y)
3x4 + a23(a1z1+ y)
2x5 + a3a4(a1z1+ y)x
6
+3a21a4(a1z1+ y)
2(z1+ x)x
4+2a1a2a4(a1z1+ y)(z1+ x)x
5 + a1a3a4(z1+ x)x
6
+ a1a4(a1z1+ y)
3x4+ a2a4(a1z1+ y)
2x5 + a3a4(a1z1+ y)x
6+ a24x
7
− 4a21(a1z1+ y)6(z1+ x)− 3a31(a1z1+ y)5(z1+ x)x− 2a21a2(a1z1+ y)4(z1+ x)x2− a21a3(a1z1+ y)3(z1+ x)x3
− 4a1a2(a1z1+ y)5(z1+ x)x− 3a21a2(a1z1+ y)4(z1+ x)x2− 2a1a22(a1z1+ y)3(z1+ x)x3− a1a2a3(a1z1+ y)2(z1+ x)x4
− 4a1a3(a1z1+ y)4(z1+ x)x2− 3a21a3(a1z1+ y)3(z1+ x)x3− 2a1a2a3(a1z1+ y)2(z1+ x)x4− a1a23(a1z1+ y)(z1+ x)x5
− 4a1a4(a1z1+ y)3(z1+ x)x3− 3a21a4(a1z1+ y)2(z1+ x)x4− 2a1a2a4(a1z1+ y)(z1+ x)x5− a1a3a4(z1+ x)x6
=3a21(a1z1+ y)
6(z1+ x)+ [2a1a2+3a
3
1](a1z1+ y)
5(z1+ x)x+ [a1a3+5a
2
1a2](a1z1+ y)
4(z1+ x)x
2 + a1(a1z1+ y)
7
+ [a2+ a
2
1](a1z1+ y)
6x+ [a3+2a1a2](a1z1+ y)
5x2+ [a4+ a
2
2+2a1a3](a1z1+ y)
4x3+ [4a21a3+2a1a
2
2](a1z1+ y)
3(z1+ x)x
3
+ [2a1a4+2a2a3](a1z1+ y)
3x4+ [3a1a2a3+3a
2
1a4](a1z1+ y)
2(z1+ x)x
4 + [2a2a4+ a
2
3](a1z1+ y)
2x5
+ [a1a
2
3+2a1a2a4](a1z1+ y)(z1+ x)x
5+2a3a4(a1z1+ y)x
6+ a1a3a4(z1+ x)x
6 + a24x
7
− 4a21(a1z1+ y)6(z1+ x)− [3a31+4a1a2](a1z1+ y)5(z1+ x)x− [5a21a2+4a1a3](a1z1+ y)4(z1+ x)x2
− [4a21a3+2a1a22+4a1a4](a1z1+ y)3(z1+ x)x3− [3a1a2a3+3a21a4](a1z1+ y)2(z1+ x)x4
− [a1a23+2a1a2a4](a1z1+ y)(z1+ x)x5− a1a3a4(z1+ x)x6
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=a1(a1z1+ y)
7+ [a2+ a
2
1](a1z1+ y)
6x+ [a3+2a1a2](a1z1+ y)
5x2+ [a4+ a
2
2+2a1a3](a1z1+ y)
4x3
+ [2a1a4+2a2a3](a1z1+ y)
3x4+ [2a2a4+ a
2
3](a1z1+ y)
2x5+2a3a4(a1z1+ y)x
6+ a24x
7
− a21(a1z1+ y)6(z1+ x)− 2a1a2(a1z1+ y)5(z1+ x)x− 3a1a3(a1z1+ y)4(z1+ x)x2− 4a1a4(a1z1+ y)3(z1+ x)x3
=a1(a1z1+ y)
7+ a2(a1z1+ y)
6x+ a3(a1z1+ y)
5x2+ [a4+ a
2
2− a1a3](a1z1+ y)4x3
+ [2a2a3− 2a1a4](a1z1+ y)3x4+ [2a2a4+ a23](a1z1+ y)2x5+2a3a4(a1z1+ y)x6+ a24x7
− a21(a1z1+ y)6z1− 2a1a2(a1z1+ y)5z1x− 3a1a3(a1z1+ y)4z1x2− 4a1a4(a1z1+ y)3z1x3
=a1y(a1z1+ y)
6+ a2y(a1z1+ y)
5x+ a3y(a1z1+ y)
4x2+ [a4+ a
2
2− a1a3]y(a1z1+ y)3x3
+ [2a2a3− 2a1a4](a1z1+ y)3x4+ [2a2a4+ a23](a1z1+ y)2x5+2a3a4(a1z1+ y)x6+ a24x7
− a1a2(a1z1+ y)5z1x− 2a1a3(a1z1+ y)4z1x2− [3a1a4− a1a22+ a21a3](a1z1+ y)3z1x3
≥a1a2(a1z1+ y)5z1x+ a22(a1z1+ y)4z1x2+ a1a3(a1z1+ y)4z1x2+ [a1a4+ a1a22− a21a3](a1z1+ y)3z1x3
+ [2a2a3− 2a1a4](a1z1+ y)3z1x3 + 2a2a4+ a
2
3
2(C − 1) (a1z1+ y)
3z1x
3+
a3a4
2(C − 1)2 (a1z1+ y)
3z1x
3 + a24x
7
− a1a2(a1z1+ y)5z1x− 2a1a3(a1z1+ y)4z1x2− [3a1a4− a1a22+ a21a3](a1z1+ y)3z1x3
≥0
The first equality follows from expanding the products completely. The second equality
follows from combining positive terms, and then the negative terms. The third equality
follows from canceling terms out. The fourth equality follows from expanding (z1+x) terms
and simplifying. The fifth equality follows form expanding (a1z1+y) in some of the positive
terms and simplifying. The first inequality follows from lower bounding some terms using
y≥ a1z1, Eq. (18), Eq. (19), or Eq. (20). The second inequality follows since
a22=C
2(C− 1)2 ≥C2(C − 1)(C− 2) = a1a3
and
a1a4+ a1a
2
2− a21a3+2a2a3− 2a1a4+
2a2a4+ a
2
3
2(C− 1) +
a3a4
2(C− 1)2 − [3a1a4− a1a
2
2+ a
2
1a3]
=2a1a
2
2− 2a21a3− 4a1a4+2a2a3+
2a2a4+ a
2
3
2(C − 1) +
a3a4
2(C− 1)2
=C2(6+C(6C− 13))
>0
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when C ≥ 4. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Recall that
R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) =
∑4
i=1 aiy
4−ixi∑4
i=0 aiy
4−ixi
The main idea in proving this lemma is to compare the ratio of the coefficient of every
term in R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC). First, we restrict our focus only to the ratio of the coefficients for
the terms when y4 is expanded, since the ratio of the coefficients terms not in y4 is 1. To see
the fact that every term not in y4 has the same value of coefficient in both the numerator
and denominator, we can rewrite R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) as
R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) =
∑4
i=1 aiy
4−ixi
y4+
∑4
i=1 aiy
4−ixi
Since every term not in y4 must be in
∑4
i=1 aiy
4−ixi, and
∑4
i=1 aiy
4−ixi appears in both
numerator and denominator, then the ratio of the coefficient of the terms not in y4 must
be 1. Since R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) ≤ 1 by definition, we only need to focus on the ratio of the
coefficient of the terms in y4 to find the lower bound of R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC).
We now calculate a lower bound on the ratio of the coefficients for the y4 terms. By the
definition of y =
∑C
k=2 akzk, every term in y
4 takes the form: zk22 · · ·zkCC where
∑C
i=2 ki =
4, ki ∈ N. Therefore, a combination (k2, . . . , kC) uniquely defines a term in y4. For i =
1, . . . ,4, we use the set Si to select possible ways of choosing terms from y and x, and is
defined as
Si = {k′, k′′ :
C∑
j=2
k′j = 4− i,
C∑
j=2
k′′j = i,
k′j + k
′′
j = kj, j = 2, . . . ,C
k′j , k
′′
j ∈N}.
Now let A(k2, . . . , kC) denote the coefficient of the term defined by (k2, . . . , kC) in the
numerator and B(k2, . . . , kC) denote the coefficient of that term in the denominator. Plug-
ging in y=
∑C
k=2 akzk and x=
∑C
k=1 akzk+1 into R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC), we have that
A(k2, . . . , kC) =
4∑
i=1
ai
[ ∑
k′,k′′∈Si
(4− i)!
k′2! · · ·k′C !
ΠCj=2
(
C!
(C− j)!
)k′j i!
k′′2 ! · · ·k′′C !
ΠCj=2
(
C!
(C − j+1)!
)k′′j ]
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B(k2, . . . , kC) =
4!
k2! · · ·kC !Π
C
j=2
(
C!
(C− j)!
)kj
+A(k2, . . . , kC).
Notice that A(k2, . . . , kC) is from
∑4
i=1 aiy
4−ixi, and 4!
k2!···kC !Π
C
j=2
(
C!
(C−j)!
)kj
is from y4.
Therefore,
R˜(z2, . . . , zC)≥min A(k2, . . . , kC)
B(k2, . . . , kC)
=min
A(k2, . . . , kC)
4!
k2!···kC !Π
C
j=2
(
C!
(C−j)!
)kj
+A(k2, . . . , kC)
=min
1
4!
k2!···kC !
ΠCj=2( C!(C−j)!)
kj
A(k2,...,kC)
+1
=min
1
F (k2, . . . , kC)+ 1
where
F (k2, . . . , kC) =
4!
k2!···kC !Π
C
j=2
(
C!
(C−j)!
)kj
A(k2, . . . , kC)
.
To find the minimum of A(k2,...,kN )
B(k2,...,kN )
is equivalent to finding the maximum of F (k2, . . . , kC).
We next show that for C ≥ 4, F (k2, . . . , kC) is upper bounded by 27104 . First, we show
F (k2, . . . , kC) is maximized when k2 = 4 and ki = 0,∀i= 3, . . . ,C. This corresponds to the
term z42 . To see this, observe that
F (k2, . . . , kC) =
4!
k2!···kC !Π
C
j=2
(
C!
(C−j)!
)kj
∑4
i=1 ai
[∑
k′,k′′∈Si
(4−i)!
k′2!···k′C !
ΠCj=2
(
C!
(C−j)!
)k′j i!
k′′2 !···k′′C !
ΠCj=2
(
C!
(C−j+1)!
)k′′j ]
≤
4!
k2!···kC !∑4
i=1
C!
(C−i)!
1
(C−1)i
∑
k′,k′′∈Si
(4−i)!
k′2!···k′C !
i!
k′′2 !···k′′C !
=
4!
k2!···kC !(C − 1)4∑4
i=1
C!
(C−i)!(C− 1)4−i
∑
k′,k′′∈Si
(4−i)!
k′2!···k′C !
i!
k′′2 !···k′′C !
=
(C− 1)4∑4
i=1
C!
(C−i)!(C− 1)4−i
∑
k′,k′′∈Si
(4−i)!
k′
2
!···k′
C
!
i!
k′′
2
!···k′′
C
!
4!
k2!···kC !
=
(C − 1)4∑4
i=1
C!
(C−i)!(C− 1)4−i
:=H(C).
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The first equality is by the definition of F (k2, . . . , kC). The first inequality holds since for
any i, the maximum possible ratio of the product terms in the numerator and the denom-
inator is (C− 1)i. The second equality follows by multiplying the numerator and denomi-
nator by (C− 1)4. The third equality follows by dividing the numerator and denominator
by 4!
k2!···kC ! . The last equality holds because
∑
k′,k′′∈Si
(4−i)!
k′2!···k′C !
i!
k′′2 !···k′′C !
and 4!
k2!···kC ! equivalent
calculations of the same multinomial coefficient.
Next, we show that H(C) is decreasing in C for C ≥ 4. Notice that
H(C +1)−H(C) = C
4∑4
i=4
(C+1)!
(C+1−i)!C
4−i
− (C − 1)
4∑4
i=1
C!
(C−i)!(C − 1)4−i
=
C4
(∑4
i=1
C!
(C−i)!(C − 1)4−i
)
− (C− 1)4
(∑4
i=4
(C+1)!
(C+1−i)!C
4−i
)
(∑4
i=4
(C+1)!
(C+1−i)!C
4−i
)(∑4
i=1
C!
(C−i)!(C− 1)4−i
)
=
−2C(C − 1)[2C(C − 1)(C− 2)− 1](∑4
i=4
(C+1)!
(C+1−i)!C
4−i
)(∑4
i=1
C!
(C−i)!(C− 1)4−i
)
≤ 0 for C ≥ 4.
So,
F (k2, . . . , kN)≤H(C)≤H(4) = 27
104
.
Therefore, we have the lower bound of R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC) as
R˜(0, z2, . . . , zC)≥min T (k2, . . . , kC)
B(k2, . . . , kC)
=
1
maxF (k2, . . . , kC)+ 1
≥ 1
H(4)+ 1
=
1
27
104
+1
=
104
131
.

Proof of Lemma 4. We directly calculate the lower bound of R˜(z1, . . . , zC). In this
case, one can show that zC ≥ C − 1 and z1 ≥ (C − 1)C−1, so the zC1 dominates the rest
of terms in R˜(z1, . . . , zC). Since the coefficient of z
C
1 is the same in the numerator and
denominator, one can expect, in this case, R˜(z1, . . . , zC) to be close to 1.
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First note that we have
y=
C∑
k=2
akzk ≤ (C− 1)
C∑
k=2
ak−1zk ≤ (C − 1)x.
Then
R˜(z1, . . . , zC) =
a1(a1z1+ y)
2(a0z1+x)+ a2(a1z1+ y)(a0z1+x)x+ a3(a0z1+x)x
2
a0(a1z1+ y)3+ a1(a1z1+ y)2x+ a2(a1z1+ y)x2+ a3x3
=
(Cz1+ y)
2(Cz1+Cx)+ (C − 1)(Cz1+ y)(Cz1+Cx)x+(C− 1)(C− 2)(Cz1+Cx)x2
(Cz1+ y)3+C(Cz1+ y)2y+C(C − 1)(Cz1+ y)x2+C(C − 1)(C − 2)x3
≥ A+(2C
3−C2)z1x2+(3C2−C)z1xy+C(C − 1)(C− 2)z1x2
A+ y3+C3z21x+2C
2z1xy+C2z
2
1y+2Cz1y
2
≥ 7y
3+(2C3−C2)z21x+(3C2−C)z1xy+ [C2(C − 1)+C(C− 1)(C− 2)]z1x2
8y3+(2C3−C2)z21x+(3C2−C)z1xy+ [C2(C − 1)+C(C− 1)2]z1x2
≥min{7
8
,
2C − 2
2C − 1}
=
6
7
where
A=Cz1(Cz1+ y)
2+C(C − 1)(Cz1+ y)x2+Cxy2.
The first inequality comes from dropping C(C − 1)(C − 2)x3 in both the numerator
and denominator. The second inequality follows from the facts that A≥ 7y3 and C2z21y+
2Cz1y
2 ≤ C2(C − 1)z21x + C(C − 1)z1xy + C(C − 1)2z1x2, since y ≤ a1z1 = Cz1 and y ≤
(C − 1)x≤Cx. The last inequality follows by the assumption that C ≥ 4. 
Proof of Lemma 5. We derive the optimal condition of the objective function to
bound λ1 and λ2. Recall that our objective function in the case of C = 2 is
max λ1(p(λ1)− c)P1+λ2(p(λ2)− c)P2
=max
2µλ1λ2(p(λ1)− c)+ 2µ2λ2(p(λ2)− c)
λ1λ2+2µλ2+2µ2
:= f(λ1, λ2) (21)
Denote γi = −p′(λi). Notice that if λ = −ap + b is linear, then γ1 = γ2 = 1a . Taking
derivative of f(λ1, λ2) w.r.t λ1, λ2 and set those to zero yields
∂f
∂λ1
= 0⇒ 2γ1λ2
µ
(
λ1
µ
)2
+2γ1(2
λ2
µ
+2)
λ1
µ
− (2(p1− c)(2λ2
µ
+2)− 2λ2
µ
(p(λ2)− c)) = 0
∂f
∂λ2
= 0⇒ 2γ2(λ1
µ
+2)
(
λ2
µ
)2
+4γ2
λ2
µ
− 2(2(p(λ1)− c)λ1
µ
+2(p(λ2)− c)) = 0.
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Therefore, the optimal
λ∗i
µ
’s take the form of
λ∗1
µ
=
√
[γ1(
λ∗2
µ
+1)]2+ γ1
λ∗2
µ
((p(λ∗1)− c)(2λ
∗
2
µ
+2)− λ∗2
µ
(p(λ∗2)− c))− γ1(λ
∗
2
µ
+1)
γ1
λ∗2
µ
(22)
λ∗2
µ
=
√
4γ22 +4γ2(
λ∗1
µ
+2)(2(p(λ∗1)− c)λ
∗
1
µ
+2(p(λ∗2)− c))− 2γ2
2γ2(
λ∗1
µ
+2)
(23)
Notice that by definition, z1 =
λ∗1
µ
λ∗2
µ
, z2 =
λ∗2
µ
, and β =
p(λ∗1)−c
γ1
=
p(λ∗1)−c
γ2
. Therefore, we have
z1 =
√
[γ1(z2+1)]2+ γ1z2((p(λ
∗
1)− c)(2z2+2)− z2(p(λ∗2)− c))− γ1(z2+1)
γ1
≥
√
[γ1(z2+1)]2+ γ1z2(p(λ∗1)− c)(z2+2)− γ1(z2+1)
γ1
=
√
(z2+1)2+βz2(z2+2)− (z2+1)
and
z2 =
√
4γ22 +4γ2(
λ∗1
µ
+2)(2(p(λ∗1)− c)λ
∗
1
µ
+2(p(λ∗2)− c))− 2γ2
2γ2(
λ∗1
µ
+2)
≤
√
4γ2(
λ∗1
µ
+2)(2(p(λ∗1)− c)λ
∗
1
µ
+2(p(λ∗2)− c))
2γ2(
λ∗1
µ
+2)
=
√√√√2(p(λ∗1)− c)λ∗1µ +2(p(λ∗2)− c)
γ2(
λ∗1
µ
+2)
≤
√√√√2(p(λ∗1)− c)(λ∗1µ +1)
γ2(
λ∗1
µ
+2)
≤
√
2(p(λ∗1)− c)
γ2
=
√
2β.

Proof of Lemma 6. We show in this case G(β, z2) is nondecreasing in z2 so that
we can plug in the upper bound of z2 to find the maximium of G(β, z2). Letting A :=√
(1+β)z22 +2(1+β)z2+1, then the numerator of
∂G(β,z2)
∂z2
equals
z32(3+4β+β
2)+ z22(5+3β
2+3A+3β(2+A))+ 2z2(1+β
2+A+βA)− 2βA
A
. (24)
In the case that z2 ≥
√
7−1
3
, Equation (24) is guaranteed to be non-negative since the coeffi-
cient of βA equals 3z22+2z2−2 which is non-negative. Therefore, we can plug in the upper
bound of z2 to maximize G(β, z2). By Equation (14) in Lemma 5, we have
z2 ≤
√
2β.
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Therefore,
G(β, z2)≤ 2β+
√
2β+1−
√
(1+β)2β+2(1+β)
√
2β+1
(3+β)2β+(2β+4)
√
2β+2
√
2β
√
(1+β)2β+2(1+β)
√
2β+1+2
:= h(β).
Next, we find the maximum value of h(β) by looking at the first order condition. Setting
h′(β) = 0 yields the following equation,
5
√
2β+3
√
2β5/2+4β3− 4β2B+β(2− 4B)+ 2(1+B)−
√
2β3/2(2+3B) = 0
where
B =
√
1+2(
√
2+
√
β)
√
β(1+β).
Let θ=
√
β, then we have to solve the following,
4θ6+3
√
2θ5−2
√
2θ3+2θ2+5
√
2θ+2= (4θ4+4θ2+3
√
2θ−2)
√
1+2(
√
2+ θ)θ(1+ θ2). (25)
Squaring both sides gives the following polynomial,
16θ12+56
√
2θ11+210θ10+244
√
2θ9+316θ8+96
√
2θ7−18θ6−36
√
2θ5−36θ4−48
√
2θ3−66θ2−12
√
2θ= 0.
The twelve roots to above equation are
θ={−1.59237,−0.951779± 0.164422i,−0.750502± 1.74268i,
− 0.547073± 0.940637i,−0.401417,0,0.356881± 0.649577i,0.768987}.
Since β ≥ 0, then θ =√β ≥ 0. Therefore, only θ = 0 and θ = 0.768987 can be the only real
valued solutions. Notice that θ = 0 is not the solution to Equation (25), therefore θ∗ =
0.768987 is the unique real solution to Equation (25). The corresponding β∗ ≈ 0.591341.
Since h′(0.1) ≈ 0.13 > 0 and h′(1) ≈ −0.007 < 0, then h(β) is increasing in [0, β∗] and
decreasing in [β∗,∞], therefore, β∗ ≈ 0.59341 maximizes h(β) with the maximum value
approximately 0.0433. 
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